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James N. Sanchirico and James E. Wilen 
Abstract 
We utilize a spatial bioeconomic model to investigate the impacts of creating reserves on 
limited-entry fisheries.   We find that reserve creation can produce win-win situations where 
aggregate biomass and the common license (lease) price increase.   These situations arise in 
biological systems where dispersal processes are prevalent and the fishery prior to reserve 
creation is operating at effort levels in a neighborhood of open-access levels.  We also illustrate 
that using strictly biological criteria for siting reserves (e.g., setting aside the most biological 
productive areas) will likely induce the most vociferous objections from the fishing industry.  In 
general, we find that the dispersal rate and the degree the patches are connected play a significant 
role on the net impacts on the fishing sector.   
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The Impacts of Marine Reserves on Limited-Entry Fisheries 
James N. Sanchirico and James E. Wilen∗  
Introduction 
In May of 2000, U.S. President Clinton signed an executive order directing agencies 
responsible for marine conservation to develop a plan to establish a comprehensive system of 
marine reserves within U.S. coastal waters.  This was rightly hailed as a major victory by marine 
conservationists and scientists who have been vocal supporters of marine reserves for close to a 
decade.  To long-time observers of the politics of fisheries management in the U.S., this action 
by the President is viewed by many as miraculous in a system more typically regarded as 
sluggish, provincial, and not prone to radical change.  In many ways, the very rapid acceptance 
of the concept of marine reserves in U.S. policy is more reminiscent of radical executive order 
innovations in Canada thirty years ago establishing limited-entry for the first time, and in New 
Zealand twenty years ago establishing individual transferable quota programs. 
Despite the fanfare, it would be premature for proponents of reserves to declare victory 
before the details are worked out.  With marine reserves, the devil will certainly be in the details, 
and whether the U.S. ends up with anything close to what is envisioned by marine 
conservationists will certainly depend upon a lengthy process of debate over different design 
options, scales, and visions.  And this debate will reflect strengths of opinions among different 
stakeholder groups: from scientists, to representatives of the conservation community, to 
fishermen and others who depend upon current configurations of regulations for their 
livelihoods.  Fishermen will clearly play an important role in the political process, since the costs 
and benefits to them are much more tangible than the important but less easily quantifiable 
conservation benefits held by the public at large. 
This paper examines the question: how will various marine reserve options affect 
fishermen participating in limited-entry fisheries?  We ask the question from the fishermen’s 
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of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, respectively.  We would like to thank the 
participants at the Conference on the Economics of Marine Reserves (Vancouver, BC, July 2000) for helpful 
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perspective since we believe that the fishing industry will be the most likely and most effective 
opponent of reserves, if any group emerges to oppose them.  In an open political system like that 
present in the U.S., the political process will eventually craft compromises and tradeoffs that 
reflect perceptions of gains and losses, and industry opposition could mobilize to block plans that 
might have large negative impacts on fishermen and coastal communities.  Alternatively, the 
process will favor those plans that seem to involve “win-win” situations in which fishermen can 
gain from reserves, or situations in which reserve costs to the industry are relatively low.1   
We examine fisheries characterized by limited-entry regulatory schemes for several 
reasons.  First, most important fisheries in developed countries worldwide are either subject to 
some kind of limited-entry program or are likely to have such programs in the near future.  
Second, we expand on some related work that addresses similar questions, but under the 
assumption of open-access institutions.2  Third, there are some interesting issues related to the 
manner in which license prices themselves are good signals about the overall economic health of 
the fishing industry, and hence good gauges of the economic impact of reserves. 
In the next section we develop a simple spatial bioeconomic model of a limited-entry 
fishery harvesting a metapopulation.  The model allows us to depict various behavioral 
characteristics of both the fishing industry and the population biology. The model is used to 
simulate the introduction of a marine reserve in a patchy biological system.  We focus on license 
prices and on aggregate industry rents to characterize the impacts of reserves.  The last section 
summarizes and discusses further issues for investigation. 
The Model 
The foundations of the model employed here are developed in more detail in Sanchirico 
and Wilen [1998, 1999a]. The basic structure combines a standard biological metapopulation 
model with a reformulation of economic models developed by both H.S. Gordon [1954] and V. 
Smith [1968].  The complete integrated bioeconomic model can be written as: 
                                                 
1 Note that we are taking a political economy perspective rather than a welfare economics perspective here.   
2 The literature on the potential impacts of marine reserves is expanding rapidly, and an in-depth literature review is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead we point the interested reader to the following biological review articles: 
Dugan and Davis [1993]; Roberts and Polunin [1991]; Carr and Reed [1993]; Allison, Lubchenco and Carr [1998], 
Carr and Raimondi [1998]; Palumbi [1999], Boersma and Parrish [1999]; and the following economic review 
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The first component is the biological system, which depicts the evolution of biomass 
levels in n separate biological patches where xi is the biomass level in patch i, fi(xi) is the per 
capita growth rate in patch i, hi is the harvest rate in patch i, dii is the rate of emigration from patch i 
(dii<0), and dij is the dispersal rate between patches i and j.   The biological system depicted here is 
a standard linear metapopulation model in which there are n discrete patches in space, each of 
which is characterized by "own" patch dynamics as well as linkages to other patches.3  In this 
formulation, own growth is separable from dispersal, and the dispersal process can be flexibly 
modeled via appropriate choice of the coefficient dij.4  In this paper, we follow the long tradition in 
the ecology literature depicting the dispersal processes as density dependent.5   In density dependent 
dispersal processes, biomass flows between patches in a manner dependent upon the relative 
densities of each patch.  The simplest representation of a density dependent dispersal process 
depicts the dispersal mechanism between patch one and two as d11x1+d12x2 ≡  b(x2/k2-x1/k1), and 
between patch two and one as d22x2+d21x1≡  b(x1/k1-x2/k2).   
The second component is a behavioral model of a harvesting industry operating over a 
heterogeneous environment that depicts the fleet responding to economic variables over both 
time and space.  Let Ei denote the patch-specific levels of effort in each patch i, and let Ri(Ei,xi) 
be corresponding rents (or profits) expected in patch i.  Then we can hypothesize a simple 
sluggish adjustment process in which the level of effort, Ei in patch i, changes according to 
equation 2.  In this specification, effort in patch i changes in response to the level of rents R(Ei, xi)  
                                                 
3 See, for example, the review articles by Levin [1976]; Hastings and Harrison [1994]; and Hanski [1999]. 
4 This lumped parameter representation is itself very stylized since it ignores important aspects of real population 
growth and dispersal dynamics including age- and size-specific mechanisms, selectivity issues, and more 
complicated spawner/recruit processes.  However, it is analytically tractable whereas richer models must be 
analyzed using simulation methods. 
5 The literature on reserves also discusses other formulations that depict uni-directional flow, generally assumed to be 
the result of oceanographic processes such as currents, winds, and temperature.  These models are often referred to as 
sink-source models (Pulliam [1988];  Tuck and Possingham[1994]), and they characterize dispersal flow as a process 
that is independent of population densities in the sinks.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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vis à vis outside opportunities (captured in the first term), and net dispersal (depicted by the second 
term).  The second term consists of a sum of pairwise spatial dispersal rates, each proportional to 
rent differentials across space between the patch in question and alternative patches.  Hence there 
will be dispersal from patch j into patch i if rents in i exceed those in j, and dispersal to j from i if the 
net difference is negative.  At any point in time, patch i may be contributing to a subset of patches 
experiencing higher relative rents and drawing from another subset experiencing relatively lower 
rents.  For the system as a whole, these spatial forces tend to redistribute effort over space in a 
manner that, in the long run, equalizes net rents across all patches.6 
The above system (equations 1 and 2) is capable of addressing a variety of questions about 
how fishing efforts will distribute itself over time and space, and how that distribution of absolute 
and relative effort will affect the biological system through own growth and dispersal.  To close the 
model we need to specify the rent functions in ways that characterize institutional features of the 
fisheries that are of interest.  In Sanchirico and Wilen [1999a] we assumed that the fishery is an 
open-access fishery in which effort flows into the fishery and across space in a way that ultimately 
dissipates rent in equilibrium.  In particular, if we assume a Schaefer production function (hi=qiEixi, 
where qi is the catchability coefficient), constant patch-specific costs per unit effort (ci), and a 
common vessel capital opportunity cost (π ), we have 
(,) ( ) ii i i i i i R Ex p q E x c E π =− +  (3) 
as the aggregate rent function for patch i, where p is the ex-vessel price.  With these patch-
specific rent functions inserted into the system above, we can examine both transition paths and 
equilibria of various systems with different biological and economic characteristics.7    
The spatial and intertemporal bioeconomic system outlined here is particularly useful for 
examining the impacts of reserve formation (Sanchirico and Wilen [1998]).  If we begin, for 
example, with a system in which harvesters freely move across all patches in a biological system, 
we can characterize the nature of the exploited equilibrium that would emerge, as well as the 
                                                 
6 This will not be the optimal way to distribute effort over space, of course, since it is the outcome of a myopic, 
open-access process.  It will also be the case that too much effort will be drawn into the whole system since effort 
will be responding to average and not marginal rents. 
7 For example, Sanchirico and Wilen [1999a] show how the spatial distribution of effort and the total amount of 
effort in an open-access system changes with different dispersal mechanisms, and with different kinds of biological 
and economic heterogeneity. 
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nature of the adjustment process to that exploited equilibrium.  In this (pre-reserve) equilibrium, 
the level of own biological growth in each patch will be exactly offset by the total net dispersal 
between the patch and other linked patches, and the harvest in the patch in question.  In addition, 
net rents will be identically equal to zero in each patch, leading to an economic equilibrium over 
time and space.  The pre-reserve bioeconomic steady-state can be formally written as 
1
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Note that while the biological dispersal coefficients (dii and dij) affect the equilibrium 
vector of biomass and effort levels in each patch, the economic response parameters (si and sij) 
only affect the speed of response to equilibrium.  This occurs because the economic system 
equilibrates when net rents in each patch are zero, and the conditions that generate zero rents are 
independent of the response rates, as in the Vernon Smith model of a single patch.  
Reserve Creation in a Limited-Entry Fishery 
With straightforward modifications of the rent functions, the system discussed above can 
be used to depict a fishery that is regulated by a limited-entry licensing system, with the 
licenses placed on vessels.  The simplest way to see this is to note that the licensing system will 
create rights that have some value to existing and potential participants.  In equilibrium, the price 
of licenses will rise until the opportunity cost is equal to the anticipated production rents in the 
fishery.  Let L be the equilibrium license lease price in a limited-entry system, that is, the 
amount that a potential entrant would be willing to pay an existing participant to lease his/her 
vessel-specific license for a period.  In equilibrium, we will have  
(,) ( ) 0 ii i i i i i i RE x p qEx c E L E π =− + − = (5) 
across all patches, where the (common) license lease price is endogenously determined and is a 
function of the total number of licenses outstanding.9   
Thus, the license lease price rises to eliminate rents at two margins.  The first margin is 
related to outside opportunities for the vessel capital in question.  In equilibrium, owners of 
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vessel capital will be indifferent between participating in the alternative fishery and earning 
π per unit capital, or participating in the limited-entry fishery by paying the lease price Land 
earning ( ) ii i pq x c π −+  per vessel in the fishery.  The second margin exists between any patch i 
and another alternative patch j.  In the full spatial equilibrium, a vessel owner facing lease price 
Lwill be indifferent between fishing in patch j and in patch i, so that  
() () ii i j j j pq x c L pq x c ππ −+= = −+ .10    
To examine the implications of reserve creation within this system of limited-entry 
licensing, we develop a simple three-patch exercise.  In this exercise, we compare two systems, 
one without a reserve and one with a reserve located in patch three.11    Assuming that the own 
growth functions in each patch are quadratic, the system of equations  that define the steady-state 
equilibrium for each of the two cases are in Table 1.  
We use these systems to compute equilibrium values for biomass, harvest, effort in each 
patch and the (common) license price. Understanding the impacts of reserves on license prices is 
important, because license values are indicative of the total rents in the system. Any policy that 
increases aggregate rents in the industry will also increase license values; policies that decrease 
rents will decrease license values.  
                                                 
10 This particularly simple structure is due in part to the fact that the rent function is linear in E.  This makes 
marginal rents equal to average rents, which simplifies the nature of the rent-dissipating relationships.   
11 We assume that the biological and economic system parameters are unchanged after an area is set aside.  This 
assumption might not hold in practice, however.  For example, the intrinsic growth rate of the stock in the reserve 
might increase after the area is set aside due to the elimination of harmful harvesting practices.  Another possibility 
is that the costs of harvesting in the open patches might increase due to an increase in congestion.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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Table 1:  Two Systems of Equations Defining the Steady-State Equilibrium 
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In the remainder of this section, we discuss the impacts of reserve creation within closed, 
fully-integrated, and cascade systems (see Figure 1). As it turns out, we can analytically derive 
the results for the closed system. In the more complex and linked systems however, the systems 
of equations are non-linear. We numerically simulate the impacts of reserve creation in these 
cases.12    
Closed Biological System 
As Sanchirico and Wilen [1998] have shown in the case of an open-access fishery, 
reserve creation in a closed metapopulation system increases aggregate biomass but fails to 
provide any benefits to the industry.  In fact, due to the absence of spillover from the reserve, the 
reduction in harvest is greater than in the fully-integrated and cascade systems.  Intuitively, we 
would expect that in the limited-entry setting, the open-access results would hold qualitatively, 
because there still is no mechanism for biological spillover effects.  In fact they do.  The steady-
state levels for the closed case are provided in Table 2.  While this case is very restrictive, we 
find that it illustrates rather clearly the necessary mechanisms for the industry to benefit from 
closures.    
 
                                                 
12 In the cases where the n-patch biological system is fully integrated, for example, the equation for the license price 
is a n+1 degree polynomial.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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Figure 1: Biological Systems* 
* The arrows represent the own and dispersal feedback mechanisms  
within and between the patches. 
We solve for the steady-state equilibrium levels of biomass, effort, and license price in 
this setting by using the fact that  () () ii i j j j pq x c L pq x c ππ −+= = −+  and the steady state 
equations (equations 6 and 7).  As is evident in Table 2, the results illustrate not only the impact 
of a reserve, but also differences between equilibria in the open-access system and a limited-
entry licensing system.  Of course when the amount of effort limited in the fishery (E
TOT) is 
equal to the aggregate open-access levels, then the biomass and effort levels equal the open-
access levels.  In this case, all rents are dissipated and the license value is zero.  Thus, the open-
access aggregate effort level provides a natural upper bound to the total amount of effort.   As the 
amount of total system effort is constrained to be smaller than the open-access equilibrium level, 
the “shadow price” on the constraint (the license value) rises.  For any given amount of effort in 
the system, there will be a unique license value of L, and that value will be equal to the 
(common) rent level in all patches.  
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Table 2:  Closed System Equilibrium Levels with and without a Reserve Located in Patch 
Three  
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As it turns out, the implication of shutting down patch three in this setting is rather 
straightforward.  The biomass density level there will equilibrate at its carrying capacity and the 
effort level will be zero.  In the open patches, the more constrained the total effort, the higher the 
biomass and the system-wide license price, and the lower the patch-specific effort levels in 
remaining open areas.  As discussed earlier, in a licensed limited-entry system, the license price 
provides a signal on the impact of policies on fishery rents.  If the license price increases after 
patch three is closed, then fishery rents have increased due to the closure.  Of course, if the 
license price decreases, then rents have decreased.   
We can illustrate these results either in terms of aggregate fishery rents or equilibrium 
license prices.  The function depicting aggregate license values (equilibrium license price times 
the number of licenses outstanding) has a maximum at the total effort levels that maximize Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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   .  Post reserve creation, the optimal number of licenses decreases by 
1/2*E3
OA.  In a biologically closed system, generally  the post-reserve license value function is 
everywhere lower than the pre-reserve function (see Figure 2 panel A), suggesting that reserves 
in a closed system do not improve economic conditions for fishermen.  An implication of this is 
that the rent-maximizing level of effort after reserves are created is at a lower aggregate effort 
level, suggesting that a reserve policy designed to maximize industry rents may have to employ a 
buy-back or other effort-reducing scheme to eliminate excess effort. 
Linked Metapopulation Systems 
Upon reflection, it should not be surprising that creating a reserve in a complete 
decoupled system does not increase aggregate rents to fishermen.  This is because there is no 
direct fisheries payoff to the closure in a biological system in which there is no dispersal.  For 
fishermen to benefit from a closure, the closed patch must contribute some spillover of biomass 
to the remaining open patches, and that requires some dispersal.  Accordingly, in this section, we 
simulate a closure in patch 3 but in fully-integrated and cascade systems in which there is 
density-dependent biological dispersal between the patches.  In the cascade system, closing patch 
3 corresponds to closing a patch on the edge of the system where the biomass only directly 
interacts with patch 2.  Both of these biological structures illustrate circumstances that can lead 
to potential "win-win" scenarios.  
For the fully-integrated and cascade systems, we numerically simulate the derived 
demand for licenses and the maximum aggregate rent curves pre and post reserve creation.  We 
continue to assume that the own growth functions in each patch are quadratic with equal intrinsic 
growth rates and carrying capacities (r=0.8, K=1), and with dispersal rates (b=0.4) equal to half 
the own growth rate.  We initially introduce heterogeneity into the system by assuming that patch 
3 is a relatively higher cost patch to fish than the other patches (c3=13.0 and c1=c2=11.0).  The 
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price is assumed identical across all patches (p=65) and catchability coefficients are normalized 
to 1.0. 
The simulation finds values of effort and biomass across all patches that bring the system 
into a bioeconomic equilibrium, given some fixed amount of effort (E
TOT). The results are 
presented in Figures 2 and 3.  For comparison purposes, we simulate a reserve in the biologically 
closed case, which complements our earlier analytical results.  For all cases, Figures 2 and 3 can 
be read as follows.  Suppose that we have a limited-entry system with some reasonably restricted 
level of effort such as 1.08.  Then, before a reserve is implemented in the biologically closed 
case (Panel A, Figures 2 and 3), license prices would have equilibrated at a level of 21.52 per 
unit of effort, and aggregate license values will be 23.31.  After patch 3 is closed, license values 
per unit effort fall to 7.85, and aggregate license values (rent in the system) fall to 8.51. 
Figure 2:  Derived Demands for Effort with and without a Reserve in Patch 3 
 
We first discuss the impacts of closing patch 3 within a fully-integrated system in which 
there is density-dependent biological dispersal between the patches.  Panel B in Figures 2 and 3 
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shows the impact of reserve creation in this kind of biological system.  It is important to 
emphasize several important results, including some comparisons of the fully-integrated system 
with the closed case.  First, the difference between system rents before and after the creation of a 
reserve is smaller than in the closed system.  Second, over most of the range of total effort, a 
marine reserve costs the industry some rents.  Thus while dispersal from the closed patch helps 
make up for the closure, on net the increase in yields after the closure is not sufficient to 
compensate for the lost opportunities in the closed patch.  However, and interestingly, at high 
initial levels of effort, a reserve actually increases license values, suggesting possible “win-win” 
scenarios.  This is consistent with Sanchirico and Wilen [1998] who show that “win-win” reserve 
designs are more probable when the closed patch is over-depleted, and when dispersal occurs 
after closure.  
Figure 3:  Maximum Aggregate Rents with and without a Reserve 
 
While the closed and fully-integrated cases define the bounds in terms of the degree of 
biological connectedness, the cascade system illustrates the impacts of siting reserves in 
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intermediate cases.  In addition, this case illustrates how the placement of a reserve can affect the 
overall outcome.  Recall that in this case, patch three is only directly connected to patch two, 
which is the center patch.  From panel C of Figure 2, it is evident that the range of effort levels 
corresponding to the "win-win" scenario is smaller than in the fully-integrated setting, everything 
else equal.   
Therefore, while locating a reserve on an edge of the system could yield positive 
economic and biological benefits, the magnitude of the benefits is less than what would arise 
when an area that is more connected to the rest of the system is set aside.  This result stems from 
a spatial Le Chatelier effect, in which the cascade system is more constrained than the fully-
integrated system but less constrained than the closed system.  As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the 
expected effects of reserves depend not only on the dispersal rate, as many have noted, but also 
on the ecological structure of the system where reserves are sited.14      
Which Patch Should Be Closed? 
It is clear that whether a reserve sited in a particular location or fishery will yield a win-
win situation depends on the current biological and economic conditions.  It is also clear that 
opposition to reserves by fishermen could be greatest in cases where they have the most to lose.  
Given the political-economy realities of siting reserves, a worthwhile exercise is to try to 
determine characteristics of patches where reserves are most likely to have the least objection.   
In this section, we illustrate the impacts of siting reserves when there exists a patch that is 
more biologically productive and when there exists a lower cost patch.   We focus on these two 
cases for a couple of reasons.  First, many proponents of reserves treat the reserve selection issue 
as if it were one of simply finding and closing inherently high productivity areas.  If this was the 
                                                 
14 Many authors have focused on the role of dispersal rates and rightly so, as it is a critical component of a 
metapopulation system and a key determinant of the impacts of marine reserves beyond their boundaries (Polacheck 
[1990], Carr and Reed [1993], Holland and Brazee [1996], Allison, Lubchenco and Carr [1998], Carr and Raimondi 
[1998], Hannesson[1998], Sanchirico and Wilen[1998],  Palumbi[1999], and Boersma and Parrish [1999]).  As 
Sanchirico and Wilen[1998] have shown for a win-win to occur under open-access conditions, the dispersal rate 
should be neither too high nor too low.  Too low is obvious because as the dispersal rate goes to zero the linked 
systems approach the closed system.  Too high, on the other  hand,  is less clear.  When the diserpsal rate is too high,  
they find that the increase in biomass within the protected area is lower, thereby decreasing the magnitude of the 
biological spillover effect and decreasing the probability that the opportunity cost of forgone harvest is exceeded.  In 
this analysis, dispersal rates play a similar qualitative role and therefore, we have focused on the structure of the 
dispersal system rather than on dispersal rates.  Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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case, then we would expect that closing high productivity areas will yield a "win-win" scenario, 
or at least dominate (higher license prices) closing lower productivity areas, everything else 
equal.  Second, under open-access conditions, Sanchirico and Wilen [1998] found that closing 
the most profitable patch provided the greatest chance for aggregate harvests to increase.  This 
result was due to the fact that under open-access, the most profitable area is over-exploited 
(lower harvests) and shutting it down results in the lowest opportunity cost.  In a limited-entry 
setting however, both the amount harvested and the net returns per unit of effort in the fishery 
determine whether aggregate license prices might increase.   
To investigate the impacts of closing high productivity areas and low cost areas, we 
simulate the closure of patch 3 in a fully-integrated system, but with a new assumption that the 
patch has a growth rate or cost 1.5 times greater than patches 1 and 2.  We then compare the 
results to a closure in patch 2, which is assumed to have a lower growth rate and cost, everything 
else equal.15  To keep the analysis simple, when we simulate the biological case, we assume that 
there exists no economic heterogeneity so that, in terms of the economic parameters, each patch 
is identical.  And when we simulate the economic case, we assume that there exists no biological 
heterogeneity.  This allows us to focus specifically on the questions at hand.   Of course, in 
practice these conditions are most likely intertwined.  For example, in many fisheries, there is 
anecdotal evidence that the areas with highest biologically productivity are also areas where 









                                                 
15 Note that both closures are simulated with the following growth rates r3=1.5*r, r2=r1=r. Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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Figure 4:  Closing High vs. Low Productivity Areas 
 
The results on the impacts of closing high versus low productivity areas are presented in 
Figure 4.  Under the chosen parameters, both cases result in win-win scenarios over ranges of 
total effort whereby the systems are severely overexploited.   Interestingly, the range of effort 
levels over which this occurs is larger when the lower productivity area is closed.  In fact, over 
the whole policy-relevant range of effort levels, the license price is higher when the lower 
productivity area is closed.  Since license prices represent the value of a policy in terms of 
fishery rents, these results suggest that closing low productivity areas might provide greater 
returns to the fishermen than higher productivity areas, everything else equal.  This result was 
also found in Sanchirico and Wilen [1998], and was attributed to  the fact that high productivity 
areas provide the highest pre-reserve returns to fishermen and hence the highest opportunity 
costs of closures.  As it turns out, in many cases similar biological gains can be accrued by 
closing off lower productivity areas, while at the same time lowering the opportunity costs of the 
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Figure 5:  Closing High vs. Low Cost Areas 
 
Next, we investigate the implications of siting reserves when there exist differences in 
costs that could stem from differences in steaming costs and oceanographic conditions (e.g., 
strong currents and substrate characteristics that prohibit the use of certain gear types).   As 
evident in Figure 5, the range over which the win-win occurs is larger when the higher cost area 
is closed than when the lower cost area is closed, everything else equal.  Also, the differences 
between the two cases are smaller over the entire range of effort levels.  We find, therefore, that 
it is no longer necessarily the case that closing the low cost area will yield a greater chance of a 
win-win situation.16  In fact, in both cases, aggregate catches actually decrease under the 
parameters assumed.  If total catches decrease, then how does the license price increase?  Recall 
that the license price summarizes all of the available information in the fishery including ex-
                                                 
16 In Sanchirico and Wilen [1998], a win-win situation occurred when both aggregate catches and biomass 
increased.  Aggregate catches are used as indicators for the impact of reserves on the open-access fishery because 
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vessel prices, growth rates, harvest levels, and costs per unit of effort.  In this case, the reserve 
shifts the spatial distribution of the catch to more profitable areas. The benefits of this shift, as 
measured by the license price, more than compensate for the loss in total catch, at least when 
total effort is in a neighborhood of open-access levels.17    
These results suggest three important points.  First, economic factors should be 
considered in siting decisions, if for no other reason than to reduce the opposition to sensible 
reserve plans.  Second, some of the conventional wisdom that might be suggested from purely 
biological objectives (e.g., to close high productivity patches) may be reversed when one 
considers the economic costs to the industry of reserve siting.  Third, if placed appropriately, 
reserves can improve the economic conditions of a fishery that is  managed with non-spatially 
explicit instruments.    
Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper considers the manner in which the establishment of a marine reserve in a 
limited-entry licensing system might affect fishermen.  We utilize a simple metapopulation-
based biological model and append a behavioral model of fishermen that hypothesizes spatial 
movement in response to rent differentials.  We simulate a limited-entry system in which there is 
a fixed amount of total effort that then distributes itself over space, determining an endogenous 
license price reflecting the shadow value of another unit of effort.   
There are several qualitative conclusions that can be drawn from this simple analysis.  
First, license values are a gauge of aggregate system profits and hence, in principle, they can be 
used as a measure of the impact of reserves on the fishing industry.  If a reserve is implemented 
that makes fishermen worse off in the aggregate, that outcome will be signaled with a drop in 
aggregate equilibrium license values and the reverse will happen when fishermen’s incomes are 
improved.  Given the almost infinite range of design options possible for a system of reserves, it 
seems politically expedient to look for options that have few negative or even positive impacts 
on fishing profits.   
                                                 
17 It is important to point out that the effort distribution with a common license price does not correspond in general 
to the optimal distribution.  As a result, there is an opportunity for a reserve to shift effort towards a more 
"economically favorable" distribution than that which occurred prior to the reserve.  In order to arrive at an optimal 
spatial distribution, policymakers would need to introduce spatially explicit license prices (Sanchirico and Wilen 
[1999b]).  In this case, it would not be possible for a reserve to redistribute effort in a manner that would increase 
the license price.   Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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Second, we show that the nature of the spatial dispersal system is important to the success 
potential of reserves.  Closed systems increase aggregate biomass, but they cannot increase 
aggregate catch because there is no dispersal from the reserves.  Open systems with linkages fare 
better.  Generally in open systems, a reserve decreases rents and causes license values to fall.  
However, there are some circumstances in which a reserve actually increases rents.  These are 
when the initial pre-reserve equilibrium is close to the open-access equilibrium (such as when the 
limited-entry program barely limits entry), and when the high cost patch is designated the 
reserve. Thus a “win-win” situation requires special biological and economic preconditions.   
Third, we illustrate the intricate relationship between possible "win-win" scenarios and 
the location choice of the reserve.   In systems where there exists biological heterogeneity, 
closing the lower productivity area reduces the opportunity cost of the closure to fishermen while 
still providing positive biological benefits.   In open-access fisheries, earlier evidence suggested 
that closing the most profitable patch would likely produce win-win situations.  In a limited-
entry fishery however, both the amount harvested and the net returns per unit of effort in the 
fishery determine whether aggregate license prices might increase.   As a result, we find that 
closing the high cost area provides the most opportunity for a win-win result in a licensing 
limited-entry setting.    
Finally, we find that getting the most out of reserves may call for additional policies.  In 
particular, in many cases it may be necessary to reduce the limited-entry fleet by buy-back or 
other means to tailor the fleet to the new bioeconomic post-reserve conditions.  Alternatively, 
regulators might consider implementing spatially-explicit instruments (e.g., area licensing) rather 
than spatially uniform instruments (e.g., fishery-wide licensing) in order to further optimize 
effort, catches, and biomass distribution.        Resources for the Future  Sanchirico and Wilen 
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